Stem Cell Research

[Eiger]

Seriously guys, must I lead you by the hand in everything? The mind CANNOT be composed of anything corporeal. Coproreal objects - including air, fire, and water, still take up space and fulfill their respective operations. THe intellect's nature cannot be composed of any kind of material. Beliefs and opinion have nothing to do with this. Don't just laugh off what you cannot yet comprehend, as in truth, the knowledge you disregard by your own narrow scope will be the knowledge most in need of discovery.Hmm, I always thought the mind was a brain process myself. It might not be corporeal in that it's a stream or net of electric impulses or such, but I believe electrons have mass - I think... Chemistry was a long time ago...

I haven't really read this, but it looked like it might be germane to your conversation... http://www.tk421.net/essays/simple.html Hehe and it mentions Ockham's Razor, too! :lol:

But this explains pretty well what I'm referring to: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/mind/electric.html

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Eiger, anything native to the temporal universe, including anything elemental, or quasi-elemental - like electricity, still is corporeal. These things exist for their own purpose, and are merely parts that compose the universe. Now, this dissolved into the whole Cartesian dualism thing - that our bodies merely played host to the mind. This is the extreme opposite of the view you assented to, being a strictily atomistic, materialist model. Both are inherenly wrong. Now if the mind and the body were totally severed, than the body would not be able to effect the mind - and we all know how that can happen :lol:.
As such, the body offers a "temporal position", for the mind to apprehend. The body is essentially the vehichle of sensibility, for the intellect to draw upon. In our case, our bodies and intellects are fused in such a way that the nature of our intellects can only draw upon corporeal reality - and make judgemnts based on its data (judgments by virtue of the action of reasoning power, using the data). A good text to read is Maurice Merleau-Ponty's text "the phenomenology of perception". He was a very technical 20th century philosopher, who explained this in detail.

[Sage the Mage]

I said that the scientific method cannot discover conclusions that only speculative reason can discover. That may be difficult for a generation completely immersed in empirical skepticism, but that's not an excuse to stay within it.

You said it again, science cannot prove this matter. Guess what? If it cannot be proven by science at this time, then it cannot be proven at this time. So its a belief.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Silly boy. The scientific method cannot explain the "big questions" of life, which demand an answer (simply because they remain questions). Stating that science is the sole vehicle for proofs is ********. First off, scientific method does not consist of simply of "data". Data sets stay as they are unless a model of reason is applied to them. Speculative reason does the exact same thing as this, but uses conclusions of empirical method as a base for further abstractions. Proofs thus can only be applied to modalities outside of empiricism, as empirical proofs come by means of this reason as well.
To take it further, your understanding of scientific proof does not exist on its own - so your entire way of thinking is simply fraudulant. Simply put, one cannot prove that even the material data even exists by scientific method. Science merely uses things in reality, and uses reason to define them correctly. This reasoning power is not subject to simply the corporeal, but concepts and ideas, such as mathematics. This system you cling to so insistently is merely a subgroup of the larger realm of thinking, of which you have yet to even scratch the surface. A few guys here have accepted my offer to start reading texts of philosophy to help them understand things better, and the benefits and improvements in thinking have been noted. I'll chat with you when you're serious, but I won't suffer you picking me apart, just to prove me wrong. That's called "falsification" - taking one small cube from the jenga tower, wondering if the rest will fall. This is silly, as one continues to take cubes, and it will fall - though only in that person's understanding. True thinking agrees that there is an "is".

[Sage the Mage]

First off, scientific method does not consist of simply of "data". Data sets stay as they are unless a model of reason is applied to them. Speculative reason does the exact same thing as this, but uses conclusions of empirical method as a base for further abstractions. Proofs thus can only be applied to modalities outside of empiricism, as empirical proofs come by means of this reason as well.
You see it now? DATA. You lack it.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

I said:

First off, scientific method does not consist of simply of "data".

You said:

You see it now? DATA. You lack it.

What is it you don't see? I've attempted to describe the "method", which is filled with data. Reason uses the same method, but uses conclusions given from data. Thought is in the same framework. Any thought comes from the senses, but ends in concepts and ideas given by reasoning from data.

[Sage the Mage]

"Speculative reason" without data to back it up is speculation only.
So whenever you state that something can only be "solved" by speculative reason, it means that there is no definite answer. You may choose to believe it, you may not, but either way its not a truth.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

"Speculative reason" without data to back it up is speculation only.

Wrong again dimwit. Even order for it to be speculation, one must be speculating about "something", which is either data, or ideas and concepts we have, that come after processing this data. lol.. I doubt you'll learn much philosophy here, especially when you refuse to read the texts, but you may, at my prodding, learn to read better. That's a happy thought.

[Sage the Mage]

Wrong again dimwit. Even order for it to be speculation, one must be speculating about "something", which is either data, or ideas and concepts we have, that come after processing this data. lol.. I doubt you'll learn much


"Speculative reason" without data to back it up is speculation only.

The universe was created by a big giant *** of doom named Donkeybutters the Third.
That's based on the idea the universe needs a creator, but has no data to back up its actual claim, or any data against it (pretend if you have to). Thus its speculation.
Maybe I was unclear?

[AgeOfAbnegation]

The universe was created by a big giant *** of doom named Donkeybutters the Third.


See? This is the problem you empirical sceptics stumble over all the time - God could be the tooth fairy or whaever, we don't know. That's ********. I've been trying to tell you all along that we can ascertain the nature of God by observing the created world.


That's based on the idea the universe needs a creator, but has no data to back up its actual claim, or any data against it (pretend if you have to). Thus its speculation.
Maybe I was unclear?

Unclear? You were perfectly clear - clearly, heinously wrong. No data to support God? The mere presence of a structured, ordered existense gives us the surety to continue an investigation into what kind of creator we must have. Something cannot come from nothing, as far as the temporal universe is concerned - I've demonstrated that with the laws of motion. Go ahead, put God under your microscope, you will fail miserably. Our proofs my means of the analytic method will take us far enough that there is absloutely no other way than to agree that there is a single prime mover, who is complete in essence. As I've told you before, I cannot prove the God i believe in because of the analytic method, but I can prove that there clearly are no other options for belief. So, if you want to use the term "belief", go ahead, but there is a huge difference between qualified and unqualified beliefs. You simply CANNOT DENY the demands of reason, and metaphysics. Your choice now is to read the text I will offer you (Aristotle's physics and metaphysics - just to get started), or to act like an idiot, and say "well u cant prove it, so I won't consider it". That's what I've been hearing from you so far, and that's a very unreasonable position for you.

[Sage the Mage]

but I can prove that there clearly are no other options for belief
Eh sorry, you can't. All you can say is that there was movement when the universe started.

So, if you want to use the term "belief", go ahead, but there is a huge difference between qualified and unqualified beliefs.
You can throw all this stuff around, but as long as you agree these are beliefs, and thus improvable, then I'm happy.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Eh sorry, you can't. All you can say is that there was movement when the universe started.

Sage, you just refuse to move away from empiical skepticism. If we can say indeed that the universe was started, and continues in movement, we can deduce its laws, and as such, our options for belief.

You can throw all this stuff around, but as long as you agree these are beliefs, and thus improvable, then I'm happy.

heh.. You exercise actions without proof daily. When you choose to go to a grocery store, will you only go if you can prove beforehand that you won't be run over on the way there? You act on the most probable belief that if you stay on the crosswalk, you won't get hit. If he universe containes definable properties, and exists in motion, we can draw conclusions about the nature of its motions. Please read the texts to understand better. I'm honestly getting tired out, replying day after day. PM me to get my MSN info if u wish.

[Sage the Mage]

heh.. You exercise actions without proof daily. When you choose to go to a grocery store, will you only go if you can prove beforehand that you won't be run over on the way there? You act on the most probable belief that if you stay on the crosswalk, you won't get hit. If he universe containes definable properties, and exists in motion, we can draw conclusions about the nature of its motions.
You can't prove that I will get hit by a car, but you can determine the odds by experiments, and that's what you'd be basing your actions on, if you even think about it in the first place. To say that you're more than likely not to get hit by a car due to the percentages of people that are hit by cars being under 50% is a pretty sound proof, I'd say.

So, experiments are the key really, if you can't perform the experiments, you cannot prove/disprove something.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

You can't prove that I will get hit by a car, but you can determine the odds by experiments, and that's what you'd be basing your actions on, if you even think about it in the first place. To say that you're more than likely not to get hit by a car due to the percentages of people that are hit by cars being under 50% is a pretty sound proof, I'd say.

So, experiments are the key really, if you can't perform the experiments, you cannot prove/disprove something.

Sure. The same goes with reason, in using the solutions from empiricism. Simple stuff. Kindly read the texts (I must continue with my thesis).

[AgeOfAbnegation]

BTW Sage, while I've got Kant's text with me here, I'll direct you to p. 347 (thru 367) of his "critique of pure reason" (hackett publishing ver.). There you will find his section on the "transcendental logic". Read that, and forever put your childish empiricism behind you. It relates directly to what we've been discussing. Enjoy :)

[Xaf]

Well, read what you recomended, not an easy read. Did not really prove anything though. Dont think my childish empiricism has changed one bit. Philosphy is definitely an art not a science.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

You're the first person who told me Kant was a poet. Scholars and historians attest that he was the greatest technical philosopher of the modern era. Ironically, he argues the opposite of what you said in many of his texts. The first section, the "transcendental aesthetic", deals directly with empirical considerations, and then he moves into the "transcendental deduction", which deals directly with methodology. I assure you, EVERYTHING is dealt with in his text. The section I gave you outlined my point that the thought process remains the same, in both empirical data, as well as objects of reason (ideas) [the trancendental illusion]. It may help if you read the entire text, as it provides good groundwork. Still, that section can stand alone, as far as I'm concerned. You'd be well advised to consider the notion that in this case, the problem may lie with the reader.
You may find his text "conflict of faculties", which draws a distinction between science and philosophy, in case you would hold the view that we're artists.

[bleachy]

I believe that stem-cell research is fine.

I don't care if you pull your philisophical or theological bull **** on me, because, quite frankly, I don't give a damn.

If you think that taking a stem-cell's potential life away for the cause of saving 10, 20, a thousand lives is bad, then why do you eat plants or animals?

Are they not as or more alive than a stem-cell is? Just because it is not sentient does not mean it is not alive, but then again, a stem-cell is not sentient either.

[Adamwsat]

I find no problem with stem cell research. The cells cannot think and therefore I see nothing wrong with it. If they could think I suppose I still wouldn't care, if they create such abominations why can they not kill them? Until such research creates life capable of not only thinking, but defending itself I do not care, tho I don't believe they will have to make anything that can think for the purpose of research for quite some time really. The main reason such research had been slowed down in the United States really is George Bush's dream of a perfectly Christian America, rather a legal system in America that will not allow anything he considers "an abomination unto the lord". I will now end this post as continuing it further would make it into a purely anti-bush post :lol:

[AgeOfAbnegation]

I believe that stem-cell research is fine.

I don't care if you pull your philisophical or theological bull **** on me, because, quite frankly, I don't give a damn.



Sure, let's not think, and not care - that's a great way to solve problems :uhhuh:.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

I find no problem with stem cell research. The cells cannot think and therefore I see nothing wrong with it.

If human value depended on the "thinking subject", we'd be in a real crisis :uhhuh:.

[SaroDarksbane]

Haven't read the thread. Just chiming in here.

I have always hated, in a debate of stem cell research, when someone said "But think of how many people it will help!".

That's not the issue. Would you kill the child next door if it meant 1,000 other people would live? How about 100? 10? Just 2? Does that make the murder okay? The issue is whether or not it's murder, anything else is just playing games.

With that said, I haven't formed an opinion on it yet.

Is abortion murder? Absolutely.

If I mix sperm and an egg in a petri dish and leave it alone, have I committed murder when it dies? I'm not sure I'm ready to take that leap yet.

Maybe AoA can convince me. This is one issue I've always been kinda split on.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

*pats darksbane*

Question - Why would you mix eggs and sperm in a petri dish anyway? :p


BTW.. You're right in saying this..
I have always hated, in a debate of stem cell research, when someone said "But think of how many people it will help!".
That's not the issue. Would you kill the child next door if it meant 1,000 other people would live? How about 100? 10? Just 2? Does that make the murder okay? The issue is whether or not it's murder, anything else is just playing games.

[Eiger]

Eiger, anything native to the temporal universe, including anything elemental, or quasi-elemental - like electricity, still is corporeal. These things exist for their own purpose, and are merely parts that compose the universe. Now, this dissolved into the whole Cartesian dualism thing - that our bodies merely played host to the mind. This is the extreme opposite of the view you assented to, being a strictily atomistic, materialist model. Both are inherenly wrong. Now if the mind and the body were totally severed, than the body would not be able to effect the mind - and we all know how that can happen :lol:.
As such, the body offers a "temporal position", for the mind to apprehend. The body is essentially the vehichle of sensibility, for the intellect to draw upon. In our case, our bodies and intellects are fused in such a way that the nature of our intellects can only draw upon corporeal reality - and make judgemnts based on its data (judgments by virtue of the action of reasoning power, using the data). A good text to read is Maurice Merleau-Ponty's text "the phenomenology of perception". He was a very technical 20th century philosopher, who explained this in detail.
Ok, then I'd say the mind is corporeal. I'd say the mind and body are inseparable, the mind being a product of the brain and that the higher animals have a mind. While not as advanced as the human one, they've got one.

[bleachy]

I have always hated, in a debate of stem cell research, when someone said "But think of how many people it will help!".

That's not the issue. Would you kill the child next door if it meant 1,000 other people would live? How about 100? 10? Just 2?


I certainly would kill the "child next door," if it meant I could save many more lives.


Does that make the murder okay? The issue is whether or not it's murder, anything else is just playing games.


No, it doesn't make the murder(if you can call it that) ok, but it is still justifiable.


Is abortion murder? Absolutely.


No more than killing a deer or a rose.


If I mix sperm and an egg in a petri dish and leave it alone, have I committed murder when it dies? I'm not sure I'm ready to take that leap yet.


No, why would it be murder? All you have done is mix them, you haven't implanted them into a female where they could possible grow into a fetus and then into a baby.



Sure, let's not think, and not care - that's a great way to solve problems .


It's not that I am not thinking, it's just that I am tired of you pulling your theological/philisophical ideals and stating them as fact, and quite frankly, it makes you look like an elitist jackass.


Stem Cells and Fetuses before 10 weeks I believe, cannot think, and therefore are not sentient, so what if they have the "potential to be a new life?"

I have the potential to be a rapist/murderor, why don't they send me to prison?

[AgeOfAbnegation]

It's not that I am not thinking, it's just that I am tired of you pulling your theological/philisophical ideals and stating them as fact, and quite frankly, it makes you look like an elitist jackass.


Actually, it was that you weren't thinking. Right now, you're pulling YOUR theological/philosophical ideals and stating them as fact by simply brushing off my texts. The jackass part is evident on your part by not only your ignorant position on the matter, but also in the manner in which it was administered.



Stem Cells and Fetuses before 10 weeks I believe, cannot think, and therefore are not sentient, so what if they have the "potential to be a new life?"

I have the potential to be a rapist/murderor, why don't they send me to prison?

You have the potential if you choose to allow that notion to take hold.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Eiger, we've been through this before. The corporeal body cannot produce "thinking", which transcends the movements of causality and spatiality of corporeality.

[Eiger]

Eiger, we've been through this before. The corporeal body cannot produce "thinking", which transcends the movements of causality and spatiality of corporeality.
Perhaps we have, but regarding the bottom link (2 posts of mine back), it appears that we've got new information on what makes up the mind. If you continue to insist that electrons and such are corporeal, then your philosophy is out of touch with reality. The mind is clearly a brain process. You may need to consider updating your philosophy.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Perhaps we have, but regarding the bottom link (2 posts of mine back), it appears that we've got new information on what makes up the mind. If you continue to insist that electrons and such are corporeal, then your philosophy is out of touch with reality. The mind is clearly a brain process. You may need to consider updating your philosophy.

Heh.. Despite over 3000 years of recorded philosophy, there really never is anything "new" in need of an "update" lol.. Truth is the same now, as it was then (there is no v1.0, 1.7 etc). Your assertion that electrons are not corporeal demonstrates your need for education on a sufficient definiton of the corporeal. Simply, corporeal is anything that can be defined. In order for electrons to be incorporeal, they must not be subject to the laws of the temporal sphere. Even air is corporeal.

[bleachy]

Screw it.

This argument will just keep going in circles, because no one is going to change the others OPINION(yes, opinion) about stem cell researches justification.

[Bhs Crew]

Eiger, we've been through this before. The corporeal body cannot produce "thinking", which transcends the movements of causality and spatiality of corporeality.

One more time. Why can't the corporeal body produce thoughts. Aren't thoughts just electric signals?

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Screw it.

This argument will just keep going in circles, because no one is going to change the others OPINION(yes, opinion) about stem cell researches justification.

Rather, nobody is going to change YOUR opinion, because you're willing to extricate yourself from this topic.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

One more time. Why can't the corporeal body produce thoughts. Aren't thoughts just electric signals?

No colors anymore, remember?

Anyway, let's look more closely at the nature of thought, and the nature of corporeal bodies or aspects. Any corporeal aspect - anything elemental, to the smallest electron or particle, is moved by other forces, and is defined in terms of spatiality. This is not so with the intellect. If the intellect were a system of movements, it would be subject to causality. Furthermore, the mind would be limited in spatiality, which is impossible, as conciousness must be outside any manner of physical locale. Furthermore (and not necessary to complete the argument), each aspect of corporeality is ordered to a specific purpose, and is also limited in its effect, which is also part an parcel to spatiality, by means of cause and effect. The thinking mind is above this causality and spatiality.

[Dark Knight]

There is no spoon.

*Brain explodes*

[Sage the Mage]

I need a concrete definition of your use of casuality and spatiality before I prove you wrong :)

The most obvious counter is to look at a computer though.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

You're back :). I saw you "replying to thread" about 5 or 6 times over the last 2 days :lol:, you must've got stuck. Then again, if your goal is to "prove me wrong", you may well be put in a bind! heh..

Your goal should be to "discover truth", instead of proving me wrong. Causality and spatiality cannot mean anything other than their common sense definition - and I believed I already explained that in the post (Physical locale, subject to movements etc). However, if you post here simply to try and debunk me, you'll inevitably fall short of your task, as you will continue skimming my texts and picking out sentances - rather than imbibing the entirety of the posts. One may ask why I'm still talking to you, but admittedly, I like to teach, and even you have some hope :lol:. I'm convinced that there is only one text that you must read to clear up your confusion - Kant's "Critique of pure reason", the preface to the 1st and 2nd editions. That should set u in the right direction.

[Eiger]

Heh.. Despite over 3000 years of recorded philosophy, there really never is anything "new" in need of an "update" lol.. Truth is the same now, as it was then (there is no v1.0, 1.7 etc). Your assertion that electrons are not corporeal demonstrates your need for education on a sufficient definiton of the corporeal. Simply, corporeal is anything that can be defined. In order for electrons to be incorporeal, they must not be subject to the laws of the temporal sphere. Even air is corporeal.
No, I'm not asserting corporealness on anything. I couldn't care less about corporeal vs. non corporeal - just trying to find where you draw the line so I can communicate efficiently. I'm just trying to use YOUR definition the way you want it used.

Ok, so it appears electrons are corporeal. Good, that's what I figured and what works best for this discussion. That means the mind is corporeal since it is basically a stream/net of electrons. There is no mind/body separation - they are one and the same.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Eiger, I agree that the body is not simply a host for the mind. This follows from the fact that we glean data from the senses - through the body, and environmental effects are real. However, the mind cannot be corporeal. I'd just repeat myself if I stated it again, but I will offer you a text that may help. You can get back to me later with comments. Aquinas, summa theologica, prima pars, question 73-84 I believe. Also, Merleau-Ponty's "phenomenology of perception".

[Sage the Mage]

Physical locale, subject to movements etc

All right, the mind takes up space, you're just thinking of taking up space like a ball does, when you need to be thinking of taking up space like stuff on a hard drive or in ram does. I don't think you can remember everything forever and think about an infinite number of things at once can you?

Subject to movements? Again, a computer doesn't necessarily have a buncha moving parts.

But you'd still agree that a computer is still corporeal right

[Eiger]

Eiger, I agree that the body is not simply a host for the mind. This follows from the fact that we glean data from the senses - through the body, and environmental effects are real. However, the mind cannot be corporeal. I'd just repeat myself if I stated it again, but I will offer you a text that may help. You can get back to me later with comments. Aquinas, summa theologica, prima pars, question 73-84 I believe. Also, Merleau-Ponty's "phenomenology of perception".
No, this is where you're wrong. I'm not going to consult a centuries old text to find cutting edge info on how the brain and mind works. Recent and new discoveries over the past few years have made those texts obsolete. The mind is a corporeal brain function - get over it.

Knowledge doesn't stay static you know. New discoveries are made all the time and philosophies need to adjust. Otherwise they become less or insignificant. Don't fall into that trap...

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Honestly Eiger, I don't believe I've fallen into any traps since I've been here. To accentuate your ignorance, merleau ponty was a 20th century philosopher, who was well recognized. As Kant puts it, knowledge changes as content changes, but the processes of accruing that knowledge is the same. This is called the "understanding", something you'd be well advised to inquire into. And no, I will not (nor cannot) "get over it". Thinking transcends time and space in activity, reflection, and speculation. So, you "get over it".

[Mad_Mat]

And no, I will not (nor cannot) "get over it".
Good. Then you can get over it.

[Eiger]

Honestly Eiger, I don't believe I've fallen into any traps since I've been here. To accentuate your ignorance, merleau ponty was a 20th century philosopher, who was well recognized. As Kant puts it, knowledge changes as content changes, but the processes of accruing that knowledge is the same. This is called the "understanding", something you'd be well advised to inquire into. And no, I will not (nor cannot) "get over it". Thinking transcends time and space in activity, reflection, and speculation. So, you "get over it".Hehe, ok... Talk about stuck in a rut.

Oh, here's that link again since it fell onto the last page - just in case anyone's interested: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/mind/electric.html

[Mad_Mat]

Eiger you really have to edit your Sig :P

[Eiger]

Eiger you really have to edited your Sig :P
Hehe - not for a while.... I'm still POed...

[Eiger]

Update on current stem cell policy here: http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20040714/ap_on_sc/stem_cells_3

[Xaf]

Honestly Eiger, I don't believe I've fallen into any traps since I've been here. To accentuate your ignorance, merleau ponty was a 20th century philosopher, who was well recognized. As Kant puts it, knowledge changes as content changes, but the processes of accruing that knowledge is the same. This is called the "understanding", something you'd be well advised to inquire into. And no, I will not (nor cannot) "get over it". Thinking transcends time and space in activity, reflection, and speculation. So, you "get over it".
I think its pretty clear that no one is going to take philosphers ideas as proof of anything. I dont know why you keep brining them up.

[Bhs Crew]

No colors anymore, remember?

Anyway, let's look more closely at the nature of thought, and the nature of corporeal bodies or aspects. Any corporeal aspect - anything elemental, to the smallest electron or particle, is moved by other forces, and is defined in terms of spatiality. This is not so with the intellect. If the intellect were a system of movements, it would be subject to causality. Furthermore, the mind would be limited in spatiality, which is impossible, as conciousness must be outside any manner of physical locale. Furthermore (and not necessary to complete the argument), each aspect of corporeality is ordered to a specific purpose, and is also limited in its effect, which is also part an parcel to spatiality, by means of cause and effect. The thinking mind is above this causality and spatiality.

I don't see how the thinking mind is above causality and spatiality. How is the intellect not governed by cause and effect?

[AgeOfAbnegation]

I think its pretty clear that no one is going to take philosphers ideas as proof of anything. I dont know why you keep brining them up.

Don't make the mistake of assuming I'm guilty of an "ad hominem" fallacy of sorts when quoting texts. As I mentioned, truth can be discovered by anyone who posses the requisite intelligence and the will to discover - these people have taken that trip and can serve us with their knowledge. I'd say quoting text is more meritorious than quoting pop culture maxims, even in figuratively in terms of what a person would perceive as "common sense". Trust me, we live in an idotic age of thinking.

I've got 3 or 4 visible posters to answer regarding the corporeal vs incorporeal thinking, and I will respond either tonite or tommorow when I have the time to do the subject better justice.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Ok before we get into the discussion, I'd be interested to see who here will attest to the notion of "incorporeality", based on my definition of the corporeal. I bet none of you will, but I'd like to have that established before we get into it. That means Sage, Xaf, Eiger, and Bhs should reply.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Hehe, ok... Talk about stuck in a rut.

Oh, here's that link again since it fell onto the last page - just in case anyone's interested: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/mind/electric.html

lol.. BTW Eiger, I just read that google-article :p. I nearly keeled over, it was so silly. I can just picture a PBS commentary with some silver-haried geek in a labcoat saying "uh.. we don't really have free will".. heh.

I mentioned in another thread how biological determinism is rediculous. If this is your idea of thinking, you're sorely mistaken. This is why I wanted you to read Merleau-Ponty's "phenomenology of perception" (google it). A person can act against their bodily demands and impulses, such as a person overcoming a temptation, or acts of willpower etc. The mind is above the mere causality of the body. However, we can still opt to live like animals, and therefore assent to the causality of nature. It always amused me that Nova was owned by Playboy magazine, and though an idol, Hew Hefner and his bunghole *****es are just animals when it comes down to it. Live like an animal, or live like a true human.

[Sage the Mage]

Beans, beans, they're good for your heart...
I replied, now get on with whatever the hell kinda point your going to make.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Sage, kindly state your position on incorporeality - is there such a thing.

[Xaf]

lol.. BTW Eiger, I just read that google-article :p. I nearly keeled over, it was so silly. I can just picture a PBS commentary with some silver-haried geek in a labcoat saying "uh.. we don't really have free will".. heh.

I mentioned in another thread how biological determinism is rediculous. If this is your idea of thinking, you're sorely mistaken. This is why I wanted you to read Merleau-Ponty's "phenomenology of perception" (google it). A person can act against their bodily demands and impulses, such as a person overcoming a temptation, or acts of willpower etc. The mind is above the mere causality of the body. However, we can still opt to live like animals, and therefore assent to the causality of nature. It always amused me that Nova was owned by Playboy magazine, and though an idol, Hew Hefner and his bunghole *****es are just animals when it comes down to it. Live like an animal, or live like a true human.

The mind isnt above the mere casuality of the body. It is just complicated. Your wants and needs are complicated. You cant survive if you just give into pleasures at all times, therefore the brain has developed to take pleasure in being constructive and doing things well. Willpower is just a concept we came up with, but it has been around as long as there have been animals with complicated decisions. Take a dog for instance, it expresses willpower when it doesnt knock over the garbage despite something delicious smelling being in there. As far as i can tell you have just romanticized these ideas and made them into something more than they are. Living like a true human is really a joke.

As for my position on incorporeality i have none. Could be could not be. But by the logic we have evolved with and by everything ive read and heard i would say if there is incorporeality there is nothing that shows it revolves around us or that we have anything to do with it at all. We are just part of the universe, no more special than anything else in it.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

The mind isnt above the mere casuality of the body.


Then it's a part of the body? So, there is no free will, no choice. You have no identity then. Hang yourself after you read this. But wait, you have a desire to live.. hmm.. Is this causal? Is the desire to live, love, and express ourself causal? If so, to what purpose, what end? There is alot you haven't even touched on. Get your shyt together before making a bold assertion like that.


It is just complicated.


Oh? What are these complications?


Your wants and needs are complicated.


I don't think so. I'm not a big fan of modern psychoanalysis (though I have a degree in it), but Abraham Maslow offered a viable model in his needs hierarchy. Yes, it really is simple.


You cant survive if you just give into pleasures at all times, therefore the brain has developed to take pleasure in being constructive and doing things well.


I cant survive if I give into pleasure? Can I give into a sense of delayed pleasure? Wait now, isn't that thinking? Hmm.. I can can disregard my base appetites now, so a greater good comes later. Causality?


Willpower is just a concept we came up with,


If indeed it's something we "came up with", it would not have happened naturally, in a cause/effect environment.


but it has been around as long as there have been animals with complicated decisions.


Hmm.. which bush should I piss near? :uhhuh:


Take a dog for instance, it expresses willpower when it doesnt knock over the garbage despite something delicious smelling being in there.


Willpower, as I defined it, was the ability to move away from an object of desire, and is not characterized by a strong enslavement to a base need - like food. That dog is just following his nature. You misunderstood me. As usual.


As far as i can tell you have just romanticized these ideas and made them into something more than they are. Living like a true human is really a joke.


As far as I can see, you've just taked these ideas and attempted to apply them to causality, and failed miseably.


As for my position on incorporeality i have none. Could be could not be.


If you're confused on this issue, you will be confused on a multitude of issues. Further, because this notion is a fundamental "foundational" concept, it stands to reason that the majority of your understanding of nature is "problematic".


But by the logic we have evolved with and by everything ive read and heard i would say if there is incorporeality there is nothing that shows it revolves around us or that we have anything to do with it at all. We are just part of the universe, no more special than anything else in it.

I don't know what kind of "logic" you refer to here, but it certainly isn't a child of reason. Of course there is nothing that could "show" incorporeality, as our senses are not designed for it. However, the notion comes from our ability to think - like substances, states, and things recognize each other. I could probably rest my case right there.

[Essex]

jesus this is still going on? wowza..

[TheDagdaMor145]

***meant in jest, you can choose not to read this post :lol: ***



*****cmon, ill buy you a drink :drink: :buddies: ****





I don't know

exactly, you dont know. you have admited it here, so you mine as well hang yourself for there is no point.



what kind of "logic" you refer to here

i wont respond to this because of my previous point. im sorry you dont understand my higher intelligence.



but it certainly isn't a child of reason.

see, you are obviously wrong here. clearly reason cannot have a child. what bush do i piss in?


Of course

bah, how could you even say this? it is clearly wrong. dont waste the forum's time with such drivel.


there is nothing

well obviously there are many things. otherwise there would be no existence at all. again, you are wrong.


that

see my previous comments.



the notion comes from

a notion does not mean it actually exists. i cant believe we are of the same species. i will now spend a few lines flaunting how i have trounced an obviously unworthy opponent. tremble before me! by the way, join my guild!

[AgeOfAbnegation]

***meant in jest, you can choose not to read this post :lol: ***


*****cmon, ill buy you a drink :drink: :buddies: ****


lol.. I've made onto the late show! :lol:

[Mad_Mat]

***meant in jest, you can choose not to read this post :lol: ***



*****cmon, ill buy you a drink :drink: :buddies: ****







exactly, you dont know. you have admited it here, so you mine as well hang yourself for there is no point.





i wont respond to this because of my previous point. im sorry you dont understand my higher intelligence.





see, you are obviously wrong here. clearly reason cannot have a child. what bush do i piss in?




bah, how could you even say this? it is clearly wrong. dont waste the forum's time with such drivel.




well obviously there are many things. otherwise there would be no existence at all. again, you are wrong.




see my previous comments.





a notion does not mean it actually exists. i cant believe we are of the same species. i will now spend a few lines flaunting how i have trounced an obviously unworthy opponent. tremble before me! by the way, join my guild!
Couldn't have put it better myself. Are you sure you and AoA aren't related?

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Related in tone, but not in substance ^^.

[Eiger]

lol.. BTW Eiger, I just read that google-article :p. I nearly keeled over, it was so silly. I can just picture a PBS commentary with some silver-haried geek in a labcoat saying "uh.. we don't really have free will".. heh.

I mentioned in another thread how biological determinism is rediculous. If this is your idea of thinking, you're sorely mistaken. This is why I wanted you to read Merleau-Ponty's "phenomenology of perception" (google it). A person can act against their bodily demands and impulses, such as a person overcoming a temptation, or acts of willpower etc. The mind is above the mere causality of the body. However, we can still opt to live like animals, and therefore assent to the causality of nature. It always amused me that Nova was owned by Playboy magazine, and though an idol, Hew Hefner and his bunghole *****es are just animals when it comes down to it. Live like an animal, or live like a true human.
That's fine. You can think it's silly. You can try to discredit Nova. However, that's just a layman's terms description of the current thinking on how the mind works, is connected to the body, etc. in scientific and medical circles.

I would imagine they think you're silly as well with your obsolete arcana.

[Sage the Mage]

You're biased towards corporeal, so I'll go with me being biased towards incorporeal this time.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

That's fine. You can think it's silly. You can try to discredit Nova. However, that's just a layman's terms description of the current thinking on how the mind works, is connected to the body, etc. in scientific and medical circles.

I would imagine they think you're silly as well with your obsolete arcana.

Seriously Eiger, you're capable of better than that. The publication by nova indicates one argument on the matter, which is not representative of the entire body of thinking on hte subject. I did think it amusing however that you did inherently make the separation of body and mind in your post (they must be separate in nature).
As for "obsolete arcana", I offered you modern sources on the matter, but then again, that would require more effort than a google search. :uhhuh:

[Havard]

Ok, as much fun as it is fun to gang up on people, that doesn't further the conversation. :uhhuh:

I'm just following the present line of discussion, not participating, but I am looking forward to seeing the various attestations of incorporeality, since that was where it went last time I checked.

Well, at least Xaf was brave enough to give his 2 cents on the issue!

[AgeOfAbnegation]

You're biased towards corporeal, so I'll go with me being biased towards incorporeal this time.

lol.. If there would be a bias, what would be its cause? I don't know about you, but life is something I take seriously. What I attest to is what I've discovered through my studies and exploration. Don't assume I'm arbitrarily selecting what I like best.

[Eiger]

I did think it amusing however that you did inherently make the separation of body and mind in your post (they must be separate in nature).

Oh? And how's that? I believe my statements are that the mind is a brain process (therefore part of the body - no separation at all) and that that's been quite consistent.

As for the google search, I'm not doing your research for you.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Oh? And how's that? I believe my statements are that the mind is a brain process (therefore part of the body - no separation at all) and that that's been quite consistent.


It was a textual inconsistency I found amusing.


As for the google search, I'm not doing your research for you.

lol.. well if you're not willing to read texts on the matter, why are we discussing it? I've been after you before about "google search" research. TO learn, one must take time with a text.

[TheDagdaMor145]

Couldn't have put it better myself. Are you sure you and AoA aren't related?


lol. actually, i agree with many of the things he argues for (such as thought and will being more than just a function of the body in this thread), though not always his logic and assertions. but hey, if i were to argue his logic, i would appear to be against his conclusions.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

lol. actually, i agree with many of the things he argues for (such as thought and will being more than just a function of the body in this thread), though not always his logic and assertions. but hey, if i were to argue his logic, i would appear to be against his conclusions.

Not entirely. THe conclusions follow from the logic. One thing though - how many kinds of logic can there be? Different arguments do not follow from different logic, but rather different premises.

[TheDagdaMor145]

Not entirely. THe conclusions follow from the logic. One thing though - how many kinds of logic can there be? Different arguments do not follow from different logic, but rather different premises.

i was refering to logic as a system or mode of reasoning (general dictionary def). it is possible for two people to look at the same premises and come up with different conclusions. so they have different systems of reasoning. if they had the same, they would come up with the same conclusions.

so, a more direct answer might be, there are as many kinds of logic as there are people to reason (given the assumption that each person is unique).

[AgeOfAbnegation]

No, there are not many different kinds of logic. Please see Kant's Critique of pure reason, preface to 2nd edition. I'll quote a part below.

That logic has already, from the earliest times, proceeded
upon this sure path is evidenced by the fact that since Aristotle
it has not required to retrace a single step, unless, indeed,
we care to count as improvements the removal of certain needless
subtleties or the clearer exposition of its recognised teaching,
features which concern the elegance rather than the certainty
of the science. It is remarkable also that to the present
day this logic has not been able to advance a single step, and
is thus to all appearance a closed and completed body of
doctrine.
If some of the moderns have thought to enlarge it by
introducing psychological chapters on the different faculties of
knowledge (imagination, wit, etc. ), metaphysical chapters on
the origin of knowledge or on the different kinds of certainty
according to difference in the objects (idealism, scepticism, etc. ),
or anthropological chapters on prejudices, their causes and
remedies, this could only arise from their ignorance of the
peculiar nature of logical science. We do not enlarge but
disfigure sciences, if we allow them to trespass upon one
another's territory. The sphere of logic is quite precisely
delimited; its sole concern is to give an exhaustive exposition and
a strict proof of the formal rules of all thought, whether it be
a priori or empirical, whatever be its origin or its object, and
whatever hindrances, accidental or natural, it may encounter
in our minds.

All of you should be reading Kant - enough of this silly relativism!

[TheDagdaMor145]

No, there are not many different kinds of logic. Please see Kant's Critique of pure reason, preface to 2nd edition. I'll quote a part below.



All of you should be reading Kant - enough of this silly relativism!


should have known better than to post....
i said how i was using the word logic, and that is basically a way of thinking. all you had to say was that you were defining logic in aristoles way, as a tool (or rather, 'the instrument', heh).

so, if you want to get that bogged down in semantics, at the beginning of this discussion i would simply alter my statement to say that while i commonly agree with your conclusions, i dont always agree with your premises. will that work for you?

[AgeOfAbnegation]

No, that still wont work. In order to agree with a conclusion, it follows that one must also agree with its premises. Some may say that one can reach the same conclusion by many different premises, and this may be so, but still that would not presuppose a position of disagreement towards the other party's premises, as they follow towards that same end.

[Eiger]

Hehe, you've been sucked in. Agree or die!

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Now it's just getting personal. No need for that.

[Sage the Mage]

No, that still wont work. In order to agree with a conclusion, it follows that one must also agree with its premises. Some may say that one can reach the same conclusion by many different premises, and this may be so, but still that would not presuppose a position of disagreement towards the other party's premises, as they follow towards that same end.
Someone needs to work on their logic skills...

If A then B. If C then B. C is true, so is A?
No it doesn't presuppose a disagreement with A, but it doesn't prove that A is true.

[Eiger]

Nah, nothing personal. I just thought it was funny. Sorry if you got offended.

[Xaf]

Then it's a part of the body? So, there is no free will, no choice. You have no identity then. Hang yourself after you read this. But wait, you have a desire to live.. hmm.. Is this causal? Is the desire to live, love, and express ourself causal? If so, to what purpose, what end? There is alot you haven't even touched on. Get your shyt together before making a bold assertion like that.
My point is there is no end. Just like there is no end to the planets rotating around the sun or birds migrating every winter. The course is set and everything is following it abiding by the physical laws of the universe. The desire to live, love and survive are all casual. And yes i guess i could hang myself but i never claimed i was above the needs of my body and the fear of death. They are engrained in us and fortunately or unfortunately i am not unbalanced enough to ignore them. Not that hanging myself would have a point anyway.



If indeed it's something we "came up with", it would not have happened naturally, in a cause/effect environment. I meant the term not the idea.


Willpower, as I defined it, was the ability to move away from an object of desire, and is not characterized by a strong enslavement to a base need - like food. That dog is just following his nature. You misunderstood me. As usual. Actually i did not misunderstand you, we just have differing opinions. A human is just following his nature as well when he exercises willpower. It can just be harder to understand the correlation between the base need and what he is exercising his willpower over.


As far as I can see, you've just taked these ideas and attempted to apply them to causality, and failed miseably. Well atleast i tried?


If you're confused on this issue, you will be confused on a multitude of issues. Further, because this notion is a fundamental "foundational" concept, it stands to reason that the majority of your understanding of nature is "problematic". Ok well atleast i dont claim to know something i have no way of knowing. And while i agree it is a foundational concept, i disagree that it is necessary for me to prove that it does not exist for my argument to be valid.


I don't know what kind of "logic" you refer to here, but it certainly isn't a child of reason. Of course there is nothing that could "show" incorporeality, as our senses are not designed for it. However, the notion comes from our ability to think - like substances, states, and things recognize each other. I could probably rest my case right there. Well considering your case is founded on something that exists outside our physical universe and we have no way of knowing if it exists, you'd be resting it on cloud.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Someone needs to work on their logic skills...

If A then B. If C then B. C is true, so is A?
No it doesn't presuppose a disagreement with A, but it doesn't prove that A is true.

A true proposition comes from the conclusion. The premise is where we start. If you would pick me apart, do it in the context in which its presented. A truth value was not assigend to the premises, rather only the conclusions. Leibniz pointed out in his work on logic that some conclusions included the premises within them, as they do in cases where metaphysics are concerned (ref. the monadology), which was our topic.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

My point is there is no end. Just like there is no end to the planets rotating around the sun or birds migrating every winter. The course is set and everything is following it abiding by the physical laws of the universe. The desire to live, love and survive are all casual. And yes i guess i could hang myself but i never claimed i was above the needs of my body and the fear of death. They are engrained in us and fortunately or unfortunately i am not unbalanced enough to ignore them. Not that hanging myself would have a point anyway.


THanks for answering your own question. Note the bold in your text. (I really wish they had color back). The course is set. By whom, or what? You cannot escape it.
Love is causal only in that its the direction of all our actions. The method of achieving this offers choices.



Actually i did not misunderstand you, we just have differing opinions. A human is just following his nature as well when he exercises willpower. It can just be harder to understand the correlation between the base need and what he is exercising his willpower over.


If you can't articulate it, you don't know it. You're on the cusp on most cases. Humans do follow their nature, but its the object of desire that can present choice.




Ok well atleast i dont claim to know something i have no way of knowing. And while i agree it is a foundational concept, i disagree that it is necessary for me to prove that it does not exist for my argument to be valid.


Than your agrument falls apart. No foundation = no argument and validity.


Well considering your case is founded on something that exists outside our physical universe and we have no way of knowing if it exists, you'd be resting it on cloud.

Physical universe? Therein lies the issue. You cannot define something without reference to that which is not. As such, you cannot have corporeal without the incorporeal. If it indeed is "set in motion" as you correctly mention, corporeality must have an incorporeal source, or beginning.

[Sage the Mage]

A true proposition comes from the conclusion. The premise is where we start. If you would pick me apart, do it in the context in which its presented. A truth value was not assigend to the premises, rather only the conclusions. Leibniz pointed out in his work on logic that some conclusions included the premises within them, as they do in cases where metaphysics are concerned (ref. the monadology), which was our topic.

Nope nada, a conclusion being true does not mean or even imply that a premise is true. This is something that's not debatable, but I worry if you think it is.

Than your agrument falls apart. No foundation = no argument and validity.

A valid argument doesn't have to be true, but a sound argument does.

You still haven't addressed the points I bought up either :p

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Nope nada, a conclusion being true does not mean or even imply that a premise is true. This is something that's not debatable, but I worry if you think it is.


You're right, but the conclusion would demonstrate the fallacy of the premises, which was not the case here.


A valid argument doesn't have to be true, but a sound argument does.

You still haven't addressed the points I bought up either :p

Yes, you're correct here as well. Valid in this case was to be understood in terms of being valid principles for our discussion. What were the points you brought up earlier?

[Sage the Mage]

You're right, but the conclusion would demonstrate the fallacy of the premises

No the conclusion demonstrates nothing other than the conclusion being true/false.

What were the points you brought up earlier?
If you expect me to read previous threads, I can expect you to read previous pages :)

[AgeOfAbnegation]

No the conclusion demonstrates nothing other than the conclusion being true/false.


Some people just like to argue.. A true conclusion on false premises demonstrates the truth that the premises were false to begin with.


If you expect me to read previous threads, I can expect you to read previous pages :)

I've always been in the habit of reading carefully. In this case, your point was either touched on (indicating an inability to read on your part), or dubbed unworthy of reply due to irrelevant content.

[Sage the Mage]

A true conclusion on false premises demonstrates the truth that the premises were false to begin with.
The conclusion says nothing about the premises, it takes another argument to determine if the premises are true/false...


I've always been in the habit of reading carefully. In this case, your point was either touched on (indicating an inability to read on your part), or dubbed unworthy of reply due to irrelevant content.

All right, the mind takes up space, you're just thinking of taking up space like a ball does, when you need to be thinking of taking up space like stuff on a hard drive or in ram does. I don't think you can remember everything forever and think about an infinite number of things at once can you?

Subject to movements? Again, a computer doesn't necessarily have a buncha moving parts.

But you'd still agree that a computer is still corporeal right?

[AgeOfAbnegation]

The conclusion says nothing about the premises, it takes another argument to determine if the premises are true/false...


bla bla blah... Go look up "induction" and "deduction". Conclusions are inseparable from premises, and from that you can trace them back. Now, would you please shut up about this, its getting tiring.


All right, the mind takes up space


Ot cannot take up physical locale. If so, thinking would be impossible. I wish I could explain this in better terms, after a long day. The mind cannot be within dimensions, as it apprehends things. The philisopher (Aristotle), held that we "posess the objects we perceive". This means, we would perceive nothing of the environs if our mind were a part of it by virtue of corporeality and spatiality.


you're just thinking of taking up space like a ball does, when you need to be thinking of taking up space like stuff on a hard drive or in ram does.


I forgot about your ability to read minds. That must be corporeal too.


I don't think you can remember everything forever and think about an infinite number of things at once can you?


Herein lies a further branch of distinction. Humans are a hybrid species - a union of the corporeal and incorporeal. Totally incorporeal beings may do as you attested to, as they do not apprehend by their senses, but are "eternal mind". We however, receive data by the senses, which is dealt with by means of the intellect.


Subject to movements? Again, a computer doesn't necessarily have a buncha moving parts.


This shows your inability to correctly read, if not understand. Motion is to be understood in terms of influence. Down to the tiniest electron or particle, motion takes place in a computer.


But you'd still agree that a computer is still corporeal right?

Yep!

[Havard]

Maybe your lame-o computers are corporeal, but mine is holographic, just like Synergy (http://www.angelfire.com/nm/JemGirls/synergy.html) from Jem and the Holograms (http://www.angelfire.com/nm/JemGirls/).

It's like, truly outgrageous! :lol:

[AgeOfAbnegation]

LMAO!! Jem hahaha... I always had a crush on Pizazz :p.

[TheDagdaMor145]

i think, however much hyperbole was involved in it, eiger's statement was the most accurate. to put it another way...

(not meant to be personal, i could put anyone's name in here, most commonly 'dubya' :lol: )

premise #1: God exists.
premise #2: aoa is not God. (i feel this is a statistically safe premise :lol: )
conclusion #1: therefore, aoa is not always 100% correct.
conclusion #2: aoa's premises (and therefore use of logic as a tool) are not always 100% correct.
conclusion #3: it is ok for me to disagree with aoa's premises, because he might be wrong.

even if conclusions are inseperable from the CORRECT premises, you are assumming that all of your premises are 100% accurate. which they may not be.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

i think, however much hyperbole was involved in it, eiger's statement was the most accurate. to put it another way...

(not meant to be personal, i could put anyone's name in here, most commonly 'dubya' )


haha.. At least this put me in a humorous mood to start the day :p.


premise #1: God exists.
premise #2: aoa is not God. (i feel this is a statistically safe premise )


Yep, I'll grant those two :).


conclusion #1: therefore, aoa is not always 100% correct.


Not 100% correct on what? Are you saying human beings cannot be correct on certain things? We can be 100% correct with things we have the ability to be correct in, including logic.


conclusion #2: aoa's premises (and therefore use of logic as a tool) are not always 100% correct.


Where did this come from? Premises will always be found out in their conclusion. In terms of any argument dealing with content, reason guarantees its immutibility so long as the correct steps are taken. If one would be wrong, its only because these steps are not taken.


conclusion #3: it is ok for me to disagree with aoa's premises, because he might be wrong.


lol.. Sure, disagree because I'm human, not because of the content I present. I've got a handful of posters in the OT who are just begging to find one small mistake, and by means of it, are willing to write off all of my posts as being wrong, or at least strewn with the possibility of being incorrect. That not only demonstrates ignorance on their part, it also demonstrates inability to distance themselves critically from the posts. Take a look at the many threads we've been on, and see how many times the've turned to emotional attacks because they lost an argument. Frightening, really.


even if conclusions are inseperable from the CORRECT premises, you are assumming that all of your premises are 100% accurate. which they may not be.

Ironically, I rarely, if ever, start threads here. I pipe in on someone else's topic, using their premises to draw the conclusion that only reason could provide accurately. I'm not God, but I don't have to be, to be correct. It's called reason. Go read Kant lol.. :p

[Sage the Mage]

Go look up "induction" and "deduction". Conclusions are inseparable from premises, and from that you can trace them back. Now, would you please shut up about this, its getting tiring.

Induction:
http://www.cc.gatech.edu/people/home/idris/AlgorithmsProject/ProofMethods/Induction/ProofByInduction.html

Deduction:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/education/asguru/maths/13pure/01proof/02deduction/principles.shtml

You need another argument to draw any conclusions about the premises using the conclusion, just accept that and go on.

Ot cannot take up physical locale. If so, thinking would be impossible.
Again, a processor takes up a physical locale, and it has the limited ability to use logic.

This means, we would perceive nothing of the environs if our mind were a part of it by virtue of corporeality and spatiality.
A robot can percieve its enviroment and react to it.

Humans are a hybrid species - a union of the corporeal and incorporeal. Totally incorporeal beings may do as you attested to, as they do not apprehend by their senses, but are "eternal mind". We however, receive data by the senses, which is dealt with by means of the intellect.

To be nonexistant and existant at the same time is impossible, so is the ability to interact with anything outside the physical universe. Now, we can affect the mind with things like beer or blunt trauma to the head, why?

Also, you cannot think about things without experiencing them, so "eternal mind" is a nonexistant thing. Imagine a color that has never been seen before, you cannot.

[Havard]

Also, you cannot think about things without experiencing them, so "eternal mind" is a nonexistant thing. Imagine a color that has never been seen before, you cannot.

Maybe YOU can't, but I do it all the time. :uhhuh:

[AgeOfAbnegation]

You need another argument to draw any conclusions about the premises using the conclusion, just accept that and go on.


No need. If joe pitches a ball and bob swings the bat and connects, the ball will be hit. Now, we don't need another argument to support the notion of a pitched ball, and a swung bat.


Again, a processor takes up a physical locale, and it has the limited ability to use logic.


lmao.. idiocy. Just because a chip manufacturer claims a processor uses "logic", does not indicate its logic. It is simply movement. Logic is a rule of human thinking alone.


A robot can percieve its enviroment and react to it.


A robot does not perceive whatsoever. Rather, it interacts. Its abilities are ordered to react to certain stimuli, and act in accord with that by means of its programmed abilities.


To be nonexistant and existant at the same time is impossible, so is the ability to interact with anything outside the physical universe. Now, we can affect the mind with things like beer or blunt trauma to the head, why?


These things affect the body, which informs the mind, as I told you. Since senses inform the mind, the mind cannot operate without sensibility to give it content to reflect on.


Also, you cannot think about things without experiencing them, so "eternal mind" is a nonexistant thing. Imagine a color that has never been seen before, you cannot.

Attention span of a 2 year old.. I qualified that last statement with "incorporeal". Your big problem is to judge higher realities by means of a mind thats crafted for temporal things. Heck, you have a hard enough time sorting stuff out here let alone higher realities. We can know these things by reason. As I said, a fully incorporeal being has no sensibility, and thus, can experience all space and time at once. The senses are what limit our own perceptions, by means of limiting the data we can accrue at a given time (senses bound in space and time).

[TheDagdaMor145]

I wrote quite a lot in your style of picking apart pieces of other peoples arguments, but I realized that it would only swerve us off topic even further. Also, worldofwar.net crashed when I tried to post it. :lol:

And I am not disagreeing with you because you are human. I am disagreeing with you because of the content that you present. The conclusion #3 I presented was that it was ok to disagree with you. I also note that you did not sign on to conclusion #1, which stated that you were not always 100% correct. Are you always 100% correct?

I accept the fact that everything I think is based on my own skewed vision of the universe (as Kant wrote). I am not certain you accept that about yourself. Logic is the means of getting past those 'biases' to uncover real truths, as we both know. But just because you understand the concept of pure logic does not mean you exercise it correctly in all things. You and I are both very capable of still being wrong.

Back to the original subject:
Remember, I am responding to your claim that if I agreed with your conclusions, I must agree with your premises. The only way that this is true is if all your steps, premises, and use of logic are 100% correct. That is not an assumption I am willing to make. Nor is it something that I have found to be true via my own logical reasoning.

sorry, this has to be my last post on the subject. im leaving on vacation in 10 minutes.

[Sage the Mage]

quote]If joe pitches a ball and bob swings the bat and connects, the ball will be hit. Now, we don't need another argument to support the notion of a pitched ball, and a swung bat.[/quote]
The ball was hit.
Was it piched? It could have been on a tee.
What was it hit by? A golf club?
So, yes you do need to know that the bat is what hit the ball.

Just because a chip manufacturer claims a processor uses "logic", does not indicate its logic. It is simply movement. Logic is a rule of human thinking alone.

You have yet to differentiate between that logic and human logic.

A robot does not perceive whatsoever. Rather, it interacts. Its abilities are ordered to react to certain stimuli, and act in accord with that by means of its programmed abilities.

per·ceive Audio pronunciation of "perceive" ( P ) Pronunciation Key (pr-sv)
tr.v. per·ceived, per·ceiv·ing, per·ceives

1. To become aware of directly through any of the senses, especially sight or hearing.
2. To achieve understanding of; apprehend. See Synonyms at see1.

Now how exactly does a robot move around a rock? It becomes aware of the rock, then it decides what to do based on preprogrammed abilities.

The only difference between that and a human, the human learns, aka gains new events and ways to handle them. The robot only has predetermined events to handle.

Attention span of a 2 year old.. I qualified that last statement with "incorporeal". Your big problem is to judge higher realities by means of a mind thats crafted for temporal things. Heck, you have a hard enough time sorting stuff out here let alone higher realities. We can know these things by reason. As I said, a fully incorporeal being has no sensibility, and thus, can experience all space and time at once. The senses are what limit our own perceptions, by means of limiting the data we can accrue at a given time (senses bound in space and time).

If you have no way of percieving things, you cannot know them, so no a fully incorporeal thing cannot think. Senses do not limit what you can know, they expand.

And...I already mentioned that its either fully or not at all incorporeal. One cannot interact with the other.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

The ball was hit.
Was it piched? It could have been on a tee.
What was it hit by? A golf club?
So, yes you do need to know that the bat is what hit the ball.


Sage, I'm really getting tired of your childish nit-picking, taking up my quality time. Seems I have to explain everything to you over and over again. As such, I'm going to let this thread die after I'm finished here.
In this case, when we know the premises and conclusion, both are easily traced and linked.


You have yet to differentiate between that logic and human logic.


Scroll back a page or so and read my quote from Kant's text. There is only one logic. If you disagree (which ultimately you will), read the bloody texts, and stop being lasy by tring to "get it out of me". If you continue to be lazy, you will remain a childish thinker.


per·ceive Audio pronunciation of "perceive" ( P ) Pronunciation Key (pr-sv)
tr.v. per·ceived, per·ceiv·ing, per·ceives

1. To become aware of directly through any of the senses, especially sight or hearing.
2. To achieve understanding of; apprehend. See Synonyms at see1.


As you'll note when reading Kant's texts, he devotes considerable time to outlining his definitions before employing them in his texts. I should do likewise, but I can't spend all day replying to and writing posts. It's up to you to do your own research. BTW, robots dont have senses - they have "sensors". There's a difference.


Now how exactly does a robot move around a rock? It becomes aware of the rock, then it decides what to do based on preprogrammed abilities.

The only difference between that and a human, the human learns, aka gains new events and ways to handle them. The robot only has predetermined events to handle.


Correct, just as a rock is pre-programmed by its nature to be solid and heavy, depending on what its composed of. Things do what they're supposed to do, in nature. Ref (leibniz on the principle of sufficient reason).
Humans can learn and adapt - a robot is dependent on its programming - as is any element in nature thats subject to manipulation.


If you have no way of percieving things, you cannot know them, so no a fully incorporeal thing cannot think. Senses do not limit what you can know, they expand.


Lasiness.. Incorporeal beings don't perceive, they infinitely apprehend all at once - its in their being. As such, they dont gain new knowledge - its something that's there from the beginning in their perceptions. A good text is "pseudo dionysius' celestial hierarchy", and chapters 40-52 of the 1st part of the summa theologica. They make generous use of Aristotle's metaphysics, and the former argues as well from plotinus' enneads.


And...I already mentioned that its either fully or not at all incorporeal. One cannot interact with the other.

Im glad you finally accepted the notion of incorporeality, and they cannot mix, your right. However, we could say that in the case with human beings, part of us dwells in the corporeal, and the other part in the incorporeal.. This is not an admixture of the two, but rather a gateway in one's being. We do however live "in the world", because all knowledge begins from the senses, as your instructors Aristotle and Kant will tell you.

Anyway, this has gotten messy - we're dealing with hefty subject matter that requires alot of groundwork to be able to make it clear and intelligible. I don't have the time to do that, so I'll offer that you read the texts. Good luck, I'm done with this thread.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Dagda - one last note before I exit. Yes, I can certainly be wrong, as can anyone - if we work outside the demands of reason. Being right is not arrogant, as some would say, but rather its humility in taking the time and effort to get it right (as well as not submitting to a personal agenda). Kant only referred to the ignoramuses as having a skewed understanding - and thus he upbraided them for their lasiness, and urged them to obey the laws of correct thought. I'm not about to call you an ignoramus, but I will ask that you read the texts. IMO, I. Kant is the philosopher to read, if you wish to think clearly. His texts take time to understand clearly (they're not for novices). A gateway to understanding Kant is his "coles notes" scholar, Ernst Cassirer. He's adept enough to capture his essence well enough, and allows the reader to get the general idea. Google it.

[Eiger]

Yes, I can certainly be wrong, as can anyone - if we work outside the demands of reason. Being right is not arrogant, as some would say, but rather its humility in taking the time and effort to get it right (as well as not submitting to a personal agenda).
ar·ro·gance
Pronunciation: 'ar-&-g&n(t)s
Function: noun
: a feeling or an impression of superiority manifested in an overbearing manner or presumptuous claims

ar·ro·gant
Pronunciation: -g&nt
Function: adjective
Etymology: Middle English, from Latin arrogant-, arrogans, present participle of arrogare
1 : exaggerating or disposed to exaggerate one's own worth or importance in an overbearing manner <an arrogant official>
2 : proceeding from or characterized by arrogance <arrogant manners>
synonym see Proud

hu·mil·i·ty
Pronunciation: hyü-'mi-l&-tE, yü-
Function: noun
: the quality or state of being humble

1hum·ble
Pronunciation: 'h&m-b&l also chiefly Southern '&m-
Function: adjective
Inflected Form(s): hum·bler /-b(&-)l&r/; hum·blest /-b(&-)l&st/
Etymology: Middle English, from Old French, from Latin humilis low, humble, from humus earth; akin to Greek chthOn earth, chamai on the ground
1 : not proud or haughty : not arrogant or assertive
2 : reflecting, expressing, or offered in a spirit of deference or submission <a humble apology>
3 a : ranking low in a hierarchy or scale : INSIGNIFICANT, UNPRETENTIOUS b : not costly or luxurious <a humble contraption>

[jim]

Hmmmm.
Clealy Abe of Abegnation has done all the thinking humankind ever needs to do and has come up with answers to every one of life's problems. He's clearly on a level above all the great thinkers this planet has ever seen, as he alone has managed this feat. i think you guys should stop arguing against the inevitable, this guy has answers to everything.

[Sage the Mage]

BTW, robots dont have senses - they have "sensors". There's a difference.
The difference, one belongs to a human, and of course must be some special mystical thingy.


Lasiness.. Incorporeal beings don't perceive, they infinitely apprehend all at once - its in their being. As such, they dont gain new knowledge - its something that's there from the beginning in their perceptions.

Again, you cannot interact at all with incorporeal objects, so you can know nothing about them. You're outta luck here.


Im glad you finally accepted the notion of incorporeality, and they cannot mix, your right. However, we could say that in the case with human beings, part of us dwells in the corporeal, and the other part in the incorporeal.

And if that were true, then they could not interact at all. You've got a problem.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Hmmmm.
Clealy Abe of Abegnation has done all the thinking humankind ever needs to do and has come up with answers to every one of life's problems. He's clearly on a level above all the great thinkers this planet has ever seen, as he alone has managed this feat. i think you guys should stop arguing against the inevitable, this guy has answers to everything.

And clearly you could use a spelling tutorial, and lay off the lame sarcasm. This is what I get for throwing my pearls to swine. If anything, I point people to sources that can help them. As I mentioned to sage and others, I simply don't have the time here to spell out everything. Go read the texts.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Again, you cannot interact at all with incorporeal objects, so you can know nothing about them. You're outta luck here.


Congrats - you proved me correct - you cant interact with your own mind, becuase you are your mind. Only the senses interact with corporeal things - the incorporeal things do not "interact" at all - thx for pointing that out :).


And if that were true, then they could not interact at all. You've got a problem.

Yes, I do have a problem, its an annoying fart called sage the mage. :lol:

[AgeOfAbnegation]

This should keep you busy for a bit Sage, I doubt you have the attention span to read it all, but if you do, it may help. [ref. Aquinas "summa theologica" 1.75.1]

Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the body has relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi) says that three things are to be found in spiritual substances---essence, power, and operation---we shall treat first of what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation.


Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union of the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry.

Whether the soul is a body?



Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved. First, because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not hot does not give heat. Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging movement, as we find proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to be the case in the movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul is a mover moved. But every mover moved is a body. Therefore the soul is a body.


Objection 2: Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness. But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. If, therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of corporeal things.

Objection 3: Further, between the mover and the moved there must be contact. But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the soul moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body.


On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul "is simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy space by its bulk."


I answer that, To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which live: for we call living things "animate," [*i.e. having a soul], and those things which have no life, "inanimate." Now life is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The philosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal: for they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal. This opinion can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make use of only one proof, based on universal and certain principles, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body.


It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is the "first" principle of life, which we call the soul. Now, though a body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is a principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life, as "such" a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act. Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body.


Reply to Objection 1: As everything which is in motion must be moved by something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we must allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is shown in Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and such a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is the soul. There is, again, another mover, which is moved essentially---namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body.


Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows potentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies.


Reply to Objection 3: There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity," and of "power." By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Whether the human soul is something subsistent?



Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is not something subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be "this particular thing." Now "this particular thing" is said not of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not something subsistent.


Objection 2: Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does not operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), "to say that the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul weaves or builds." Therefore the soul is not subsistent.


Objection 3: Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from the body, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding does not take place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from the body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent.


On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): "Who understands that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body, will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are led astray through associating with the soul those things without which they are unable to think of any nature---i.e. imaginary pictures of corporeal things." Therefore the nature of the human intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, something subsistent.


I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of that same color.


Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation "per se" apart from the body. Now only that which subsists can have an operation "per se." For nothing can operate but what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat imparts heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent.


Reply to Objection 1: "This particular thing" can be taken in two senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists, and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called "this particular thing" in the first sense, but not in the second. Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can indeed be called "this particular thing," in the first sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the second, for in this sense, what is composed of body and soul is said to be "this particular thing."


Reply to Objection 2: Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to operate "per se" belongs to what exists "per se." But for a thing to exist "per se," it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a material form; even though it be part of something. Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist "per se," which is neither inherent in the above sense, nor part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist "per se"; nor can it for that reason be said to operate "per se." Hence the operation of the parts is through each part attributed to the whole. For we say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand, and not in the same sense as when we say that what is hot gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul understands, as the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that man understands through the soul.


Reply to Objection 3: The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its origin of action, but on the part of the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight. Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses in order to perform its act of perception.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?



Objection 1: It would seem that the souls of brute animals are subsistent. For man is of the same 'genus' as other animals; and, as we have just shown (Article [2]), the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore the souls of other animals are subsistent.


Objection 2: Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart from the body, apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty, apart from the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since the souls of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are subsistent; just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent.


Objection 3: Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the body is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute animals has an operation apart from the body.


On the contrary, Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi, xvii: "Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the souls of animals are not subsistent."


I answer that, The ancient philosophers made no distinction between sense and intellect, and referred both a corporeal principle, as has been said (Article [1]). Plato, however, drew a distinction between intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the consequent operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body; thus in the act of vision, the pupil of the eye is affected by a reflection of color: and so with the other senses. Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has no "per se" operation of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the composite. Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute animals have no "per se" operations they are not subsistent. For the operation of anything follows the mode of its being.


Reply to Objection 1: Although man is of the same "genus" as other animals, he is of a different "species." Specific difference is derived from the difference of form; nor does every difference of form necessarily imply a diversity of "genus."


Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to the intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations differ, inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower. If, however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms.


Reply to Objection 3: Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive power, commands motion. The operation of this power in the sensitive soul is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a like nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive power is that which executes motion in adapting the members for obeying the appetite; and the act of this power does not consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear that to move is not an act of the sensitive soul without the body.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Whether the soul is man?



Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written (2 Cor. 4:16): "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." But that which is within man is the soul. Therefore the soul is the inward man.


Objection 2: Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore it is a "hypostasis" or a person; and it can only be a human person. Therefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man.


On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as holding "that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul and body."


I answer that, The assertion "the soul is man," can be taken in two senses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular man, Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species. This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given species, must belong to the substance of the species.


It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man; and this could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of a man is man. But it has been shown above (Article [3]) that sensation is not the operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through supposing that sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul making use of the body.


Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8), a thing seems to be chiefly what is principle in it; thus what the governor of a state does, the state is said to do. In this way sometimes what is principle in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, the intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is called the "inward" man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the body is called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go beyond the senses. And this is called the "outward" man.


Reply to Objection 2: Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human species.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?



Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God; by participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are living things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v). Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter. Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality; which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially understanding; it seems that the human soul must participate of primary matter, as part of itself.


Objection 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the soul---namely, to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul.


Objection 3: Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God. Therefore the soul has matter.


Objection 4: Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the soul has matter.


On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.


I answer that, The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the "primary animate."


Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form.


Reply to Objection 1: The First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually "precontaining all things," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which all participated acts are derived; for then the receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act. Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form.


Reply to Objection 2: To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.


Reply to Objection 3: The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of matter and form "there is no other cause but that which moves from potentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once." [*The Leonine edition has, "simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid." The Parma edition of St. Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle has, "statim per se unum quiddam est . . . et ens quiddam."]


Reply to Objection 4: Everything participated is compared to the participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist "per se," must have existence by participation; for "even life," or anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore some say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that "which they are"; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Whether the human soul is incorruptible?



Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is alike in both; because "all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing more than the beast," as it is written (Eccles. 3:19). Therefore, as the same text concludes, "the death of man and beast is one, and the condition of both is equal." But the souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore, also, the human soul is corruptible.


Objection 2: Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But as it is written (Wis. 2:2), "We are born of nothing"; which is true, not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in the same passage, "After this we shall be as if we had not been," even as to our soul.


Objection 3: Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands nothing without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot survive the dissolution of the body.


On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they have "an incorruptible substantial life."


I answer that, We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted in two ways---"per se," and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the generation or corruption of something else. For generation and corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever has existence "per se" cannot be generated or corrupted except 'per se'; while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and material forms, acquire existence or lost it through the generation or corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above (Articles [2],3) that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted "per se." This, indeed, is impossible, not only as regards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist.


Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries and into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to the manner of its existence, and those things which it receives are without contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not themselves contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now, in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except under the conditions of "here" and "now," whereas the intellect apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time; so that everything that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible.


Reply to Objection 1: Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as expressed in the words of Wisdom 2. Therefore the saying that man and animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for all animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul. For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas the human soul is produced by God. To signify this it is written as to other animals: "Let the earth bring forth the living soul" (Gn. 1:24): while of man it is written (Gn. 2:7) that "He breathed into his face the breath of life." And so in the last chapter of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is concluded: "(Before) the dust return into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to God Who gave it." Again the process of life is alike as to the body, concerning which it is written (Eccles. 3:19): "All things breathe alike," and (Wis. 2:2), "The breath in our nostrils is smoke." But the process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas animals are not. Hence it is false to say: "Man has nothing more than beasts." Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, by not as to the soul.


Reply to Objection 2: As a thing can be created by reason, not of a passive potentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the Creator, Who can produce something out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can be reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature a potentiality to non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sustain existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible because there is in it a potentiality to non-existence.


Reply to Objection 3: To understand through a phantasm is the proper operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the body. After separation from the body it will have another mode of understanding, similar to other substances separated from bodies, as will appear later on (Question [89], Article [1]).

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?



Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is of the same species as an angel. For each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature of its species, whence is derived its inclination for that end. But the end of the soul is the same as that of an angel---namely, eternal happiness. Therefore they are of the same species.


Objection 2: Further, the ultimate specific difference is the noblest, because it completes the nature of the species. But there is nothing nobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual nature. Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate specific difference: therefore they belong to the same species.


Objection 3: Further, it seems that the soul does not differ from an angel except in its union with the body. But as the body is outside the essence of the soul, it seems that it does not belong to its species. Therefore the soul and angel are of the same species.


On the contrary, Things which have different natural operations are of different species. But the natural operations of the soul and of an angel are different; since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), "Angelic minds have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering their knowledge of Divine things from visible things." Subsequently he says the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the soul and an angel are not of the same species.


I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon iii, 5) held that human souls and angels are all of the same species; and this because he supposed that in these substances the difference of degree was accidental, as resulting from their free-will: as we have seen above (Question [47], Article [2]). But this cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be diversity of number without diversity of species and inequality of nature; because, as they are not composed of matter and form, but are subsistent forms, it is clear that there is necessarily among them a diversity of species. For a separate form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a single species; thus, supposing a separate whiteness to exist, it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness does not differ from another except as in this or that subject. But diversity of species is always accompanied with a diversity of nature; thus in species of colors one is more perfect than another; and the same applies to other species, because differences which divide a "genus" are contrary to one another. Contraries, however, are compared to one another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the "principle of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof," as is written Metaph. x (Did. ix, 4). The same would follow if the aforesaid substances were composed of matter and form. For if the matter of one be distinct from the matter of another, it follows that either the form is the principle of the distinction of matter---that is to say, that the matter is distinct on account of its relation to divers forms; and even then there would result a difference of species and inequality of nature: or else the matter is the principle of the distinction of forms. But one matter cannot be distinct from another, except by a distinction of quantity, which has no place in these incorporeal substances, such as an angel and the soul. So that it is not possible for the angel and the soul to be of the same species. How it is that there can be many souls of one species will be explained later (Question [76], Article [2], ad 1).


Reply to Objection 1: This argument proceeds from the proximate and natural end. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end.


Reply to Objection 2: The ultimate specific difference is the noblest because it is the most determinate, in the same way as actuality is nobler than potentiality. Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is not the noblest, because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees of intellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in the sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible things are not of one species, so neither are all intellectual things of one species.


Reply to Objection 3: The body is not of the essence of the soul; but the soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so that, properly speaking, not the soul alone, but the "composite," is the species. And the very fact that the soul in a certain way requires the body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, who is not united to a body.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

Whether the intellect is a power of the soul?



Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): "Mind and spirit are not relative things, but denominate the essence." Therefore the intellect is the essence of the soul.


Objection 2: Further, different genera of the soul's powers are not united in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now the appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but they are united in the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence and will in the mind. Therefore the mind and intellect of man is of the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof.


Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), "man understands with the angels." But angels are called "minds" and "intellects." Therefore the mind and intellect of man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself.


Objection 4: Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence.


On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3).


I answer that, In accordance with what has been already shown (Question [54], Article [3]; Question [77], Article [1]) it is necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For then alone the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation, when operation itself is its being: for as power is to operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone His action of understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence: while in other intellectual creatures, the intellect is power.


Reply to Objection 1: Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief power; and thus we read (De Anima i, 4), that the "intellect is a substance." And in this sense also Augustine says that the mind is spirit and essence (De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16).


Reply to Objection 2: The appetitive and intellectual powers are different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts the will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii, 9).


Reply to Objection 3: In the angels there is no other power besides the intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this reason an angel is called a "mind" or an "intellect"; because his whole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers, such as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the comparison fails.


Reply to Objection 4: The immateriality of the created intelligent substance is not its intellect; and through its immateriality it has the power of intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

... and to expand the point in Kant's text on the nature of reason (speculative and empirical)...


Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers?



Objection 1: It would seem that the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are different kinds of powers, as is clear from De Anima ii, 3. But the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct powers.


Objection 2: Further, the different nature of the object differentiates the power. But the object of the speculative intellect is "truth," and of the practical is "good"; which differ in nature. Therefore the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers.


Objection 3: Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the imaginative, as power form power, as we have said above (Question [78], Article [4]). Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the practical.


On the contrary, The speculative intellect by extension becomes practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers.


I answer that, The speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above (Question [77], Article [3]), what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a thing colored to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such things are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed to operation or not, and according to this the speculative and practical intellects differ. For it is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10); that "the speculative differs from the practical in its end." Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, the other practical---i.e. operative.


Reply to Objection 1: The practical intellect is a motive power, not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it according to its mode of apprehension.


Reply to Objection 2: Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the object of the practical intellect is good directed to the operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation.


Reply to Objection 3: Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said above (Article [7], ad 2; Question [77], Article [3], ad 4).

[SaroDarksbane]

Hehe, you've been sucked in. Agree or die!
Haha, that made me laugh. :thumbsup:

Anyway, um, interesting thread. :evil:

[Sage the Mage]

Only the senses interact with corporeal things - the incorporeal things do not "interact" at all - thx for pointing that out

These things affect the body, which informs the mind, as I told you. Since senses inform the mind, the mind cannot operate without sensibility to give it content to reflect on.

If there is influence at all, there must be interaction between the two.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

lol.. This is laughable. I go out of my way, posting pages of text to demonstrate to you how that can be so, yet you bypass it all. This is what I'm talking about - you're a childish nitpicker, and not worthy of my time.

[Sage the Mage]

Reply to Objection 1: As everything which is in motion must be moved by something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we must allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is shown in Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and such a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is the soul. There is, again, another mover, which is moved essentially---namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body.

That still requires the soul to be moved, and thus has a cause. Maybe the definition is unclear for "body"?

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows potentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies.

Boils down to: a soul can know of a body because it potentially can. Potential knowlege implies that there can be actual knowledge. Now, I wouldn't know colors existed if I didn't have my eyes to inform me. So, the soul would have to be informed by the senses, which leads to interaction"

Reply to Objection 3: There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity," and of "power." By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body.

That's saying an incorporeal object can move because it can, unless you can show otherwise. So, you know the reply above this? That problem still exists, how does an incorporeal object interact with a corporeal one?

...Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the "primary animate."

Explain why it cannot be a form by virtue of something else?
(Assuming by virtue of implies caused by)

Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form.
This looks non sequitor to me. Because the soul can recognize patterns its incorporeal?

Reply to Objection 1: Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as expressed in the words of Wisdom 2. Therefore the saying that man and animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for all animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul. For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas the human soul is produced by God. To signify this it is written as to other animals: "Let the earth bring forth the living soul" (Gn. 1:24): while of man it is written (Gn. 2:7) that "He breathed into his face the breath of life." And so in the last chapter of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is concluded: "(Before) the dust return into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to God Who gave it." Again the process of life is alike as to the body, concerning which it is written (Eccles. 3:19): "All things breathe alike," and (Wis. 2:2), "The breath in our nostrils is smoke." But the process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas animals are not. Hence it is false to say: "Man has nothing more than beasts." Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, by not as to the soul.

Translation: "Because the Bible says so." But it was Aquinas correct? So that's probably why.

Reply to Objection 2: To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.

Translation: "Knowledge is changed, but its incorporeal, so incorporeal things can be changed!" You can see the obvious problem if I'm reading this right.

Reply to Objection 4: Everything participated is compared to the participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist "per se," must have existence by participation; for "even life," or anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore some say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that "which they are"; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.

As I said, a fully incorporeal being has no sensibility, and thus, can experience all space and time at once. The senses are what limit our own perceptions, by means of limiting the data we can accrue at a given time (senses bound in space and time).

You have a disagreement here, so no need for me to argue this one :)

The rest of the stuff is probably useless via reading the nifty titles, so I'm ignoring it unless you can show otherwise.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

heh.. I figured as much. It's tough to read (I can't see any disagreement in what I've said with his texts), I'll grant you that, but I can't present it any more thoroughly than he did in the text. He is speaking to learned men, so that clearly puts you on the backburner. The language is easy to grasp when you've read aristotle for instance. Kant does likewise, and takes time to define his work before presenting. As I said earlier, these matters require delicate treatment, and I'm not doing justice to it with small posts. Some take the bait and learn, others demand more time, like you do. My advice to you is to start reading texts, any texts you want in philiosoply - even stuff that you may agree with - like the empiricists. You may find in their work, and especially the work of their detractors, that the position itself is folly.
The way he drafts his arguments is from the most basic, foundational premise, and builds. I started at around question 75, so a reading of the first part of the text should help you grasp the language better. Kant, since hes a modern, is easy to understand if you chew it slowly. But to understand all this stuff, you really must slow down. I think you're naturally smart, but you rely too much on assumption and the popular thought of the day. In order to become a mature thinker, you must take a critical distance from the prevalent ideas and notions of contemporary cultural thinking. THere is some merit in the contemporaries, but you'd be well advised to find out where it came from, and where it's going. You may like M. Foucault - he just died in '82. Also, R.Rorty is something you might like, and it may please you to know I think he's an idiot, so that may prompt you to read his stuff :p. Perhaps you can come back with those texts and try to cut me down, w/e.
So, you did look over the texts after my little prod there, and you struggled with its definitions, which is understandable. I myself had trouble at start. But really, you're looking at things halfway up the mountain, and that's partly my fault, but the texts had direct reference to the incorporeal, and I thought I'd pop those in there.
Try Aristotle's DeAnima - you can google that for a free read. THat explains the terminology of powers, bodies, etc. If that's still confusing, go back to plato, as aristotle commonly refines and revises plato - all language comes from somewhere. Anyway, I'm off to bed.

[Xaf]

Just so you know im still right and you are wrong and there is nothing you can do about it. MUWAHAHAHAH. Where is plato to save you now????

*AOA jumps in his bill and teds time machine and delivers Plato to my room*

damnit this guy just always has the last word.

[AgeOfAbnegation]

:lol: Socrates died by choosing to take hemlock (a lethal toxin), over assenting to believe a blatant lie. I'll go for the hemlock. :)